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The widespread principal-agent problem in labor relationships shows, workers 
have incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior under guaranteed salary and 
information asymmetry. This issue in professional sports has received more and more 
attention in recent years. Many scholars have investigated the incentive mechanism of 
long-term contract and its impact on player performance. 
From a new perspective of big contract, we innovatively propose to utilize the 
design of quasi-experiment and Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimation based on 
Mahalanobis Distance Matching to empirically examine the influence of contract-
related incentives on player performance---the contract year effect and the big contract 
effect, using a detailed dataset of 5415 observations from 809 players during season 
2004--05 and 2014--15. We find that, players before signing a new contract purposely 
improve individual performance, although insignificant, to secure a more lucrative 
contract, while they tend to shirk once they get a big contract, thus lowering 
performance significantly. Regressions on grouped sample show that, star players with 
annual salary above 10 million dollars are less likely to shirk compared to ordinary ones, 
evidenced by smaller decline in performance. Further analyses support the negative 
relationship between remaining years and individual performance, which is, incentives 
to shirk gradually decline over the duration of contract. Besides, the degree of players’ 
reduced effort is associated with longer length of contract. 
Therefore, we conclude big contracts do exert strong incentive effects on 
professional athletes, inducing them to vary effort strategically before and after signing 
a contract to maximize expected utility. 
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业体育联赛之一，每年都会吸引数以亿计的球迷的关注。NBA 在 2014--15 赛季
的总收入达到 51.8 亿美元，得益于新转播合同实行、全球性收入增加、赞助费
用提升和观众数量上升，未来几年其收入还会迎来一个阶梯式增长。现如今 NBA
拥有 30 支球队，分属 2 个分区（Conference）：东部联盟和西部联盟；而每个联
盟各由 3 个赛区（Division）组成，每个赛区有 5 支球队。按照每支球队拥有 15
名球员估算，NBA 共有 450 名球员，这一数字还没有把流动球员、发展联盟球












































称作“合同年”效应。比如，芝加哥公牛队的 Jimmy Butler 在 2014--15 赛季进入
当时合同的最后一年，当赛季他也创造了职业生涯最好的数据表现。赛季中他场
均得到 20.0 分、5.8 个篮板和 3.3 个助攻，其他各项数据统计指标相比生涯平均








效应。一个例子是 Chandler Parsons，他在 2016 年 7 月同孟菲斯灰熊队签订了一
份 4 年总价值达到 9400 万美元的合同。但 2016--17 赛季前半季他的表现全面下
滑，场均得到 6.5 分、2.4 个篮板和 1.6 个助攻，各项数据远低于生涯平均水平，
球员效率值从上赛季的 16.2 降至 9.2。 
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